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202 BRUlilTON V. SUPERIOR COURT [20C. (2d) 
, [L. A. No. 18140. In Bank. Apr. 21, 1942.] 
WILLIAl\l J. BRUNTON, as City Council Member; etc., et aI., 
, , Petitioners,' v.THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1], 'Qontemph-:Certiorari.-The jurisdiction of a lower court to 
, ',isSlue,a final judgment, of contempt may, be reviewed on cer-
, ,', tiorari. The question as to whether the a/lts complained of 
, ,,' can, constitute. a contempt is a jurisdictional one for the pur-
, 'pose~ of such review. ' 
[~l. :tD.iunctions-Violation-Certainty.-To authorize holding a' 
. , 'person guilty of c'ontempt for violating an injunction, the acts 
',: ; constituting the contempt must be clearly and specifically pro-
,; hibited by the terms of the injunction. One cannot be held 
guilty of contempt for violating an injunction that is uncer-
tain or ambiguous. 
[3a, '.Sb]' Id, - Violation.:.-Acts Constituting-Collecting Fees.-
,,,,.Where an injunction by its terms enjoins the collection of 
, , . ,feee, fQr oil permits required by certain ordinances, and there 
t' ,)~~,nl?)ndication of a~illtent to prohibit the charging of fees :.) 
.) ,}fj'ffider: a~y !>ther ord~nance, an attempt to ,collect fees. under ' 
, new,,' ordinances that' are materially different does not consti-
tuteJa>rlolation of the injunction punishable as for contempt. 
[4~'i':J;~~~~f~l?istin~tio~&::-:"PriVilege Tax.-If a fe~ ~or a permit 
') . ,t<)' Orilloil 18a tax, It 'IS but a tax upon the prlvdege; and a 
'privilege tax is not a property tax within Const., art. XIII, 
". §1;)and' other sections 'of the Constitution. ' 
,f ' 
,PROCEEDING to review an order of the Superior, Court 
of, ,Los Angeles County' adjudging guilt of contempt. Emmet 
H. Wilson, Judge. Order annulled. 
Irving M. Smith, City Attorney (Long Beach), and Roy J. 
Brown and Frank C. C.harvat, Deputies City Attorney, for 
Petitioners. ' 
,J. H. O?Connor, County Counsel, W. B. MqKesson, Deputy 
County Counsel, and George H. Emerson for 'Respondent. 
[1] See 5 Cal. Jur. 918, 955; 10 Am. Jur. 538. 
[2] See 7 Cal. Jur. 843. 
t4] Property and other taxes distinguished; note, 103 A. L. R. 
18. See, also, 24 Cal. Jur. 37; 26 R. C. L. 15. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contempt, § 77; [2] Injunctions, 
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TRAYNOR, J.-The Los Angeles County FloodContrQl 
District owns certain real property in the channel of the Los 
Angeles River located in the harbor district of the city of L()ng 
Beach. In 1939 the Flood Control District entered into an 
agreement with the Continental Corporation giving the latter 
the right to operate oil wells upon the property. Certain ordi-
nances of the city of Long Beach prohibited the operation of 
oil wells within this area, and the officials of the city refused 
to issue permits or to allow the operation of oil wells on the 
Flood Control District's property. The Flood Control Dis-
trict and the Continental Corporation thereupon brought an 
action against the city of Long Beach and certain of its officers 
to enjoin the enforcement of all ordin'ances affecting the right 
of plaintiffs to drill for oil. The trial court held that those 
' ordinances entirely prohibiting plaintiffs from drilling for oil 
upon the land in question were unreasonable and discrimina-
tory and therefore invalid. 
Ordinance C-1549 as amended by 0-1739 and ordinance 
H. D. 22 as amended by, H. D. 38 required each perso~ drill-
ing for oil in the harbor district of Long Beach to obtain a 
permit from the board of harbor commissioners and to pay 
that board a seven hundred and fifty dollar "Investiga-
tion and Permit Fee" and a one hundred and fifty dollar 
"Annual Permit Renewal and Inspection Fee" each fiscal 
year thereafter. The trial court found that these fees were 
imposed II for revenue as well as for regulation," that any 
application for such a permit is made by the' Flood Control 
District I I through its officers acting in their official capaci-
ties, "'a,nd that the fees are payable "for the performance of 
official services of the officers named in said ordinances." It 
concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to obtain such 
permits "without the payment of any of the fees prescribed 
by said ordinances II and enjoined defendants from "enforc-
ing, seeking, or threatening to enforce: . . . the provisions 
relating to the payment of fees ... in ... ordinance H. D. 
number 22 as amended by ordinance H. D. number 38, and 
ordinance C-1549 as amended by ordinance C-1739." No 
appeal was taken from this judgment, and it has become final. 
In compliance with the injunction, permits were issued to the 
Flood Control District withbut payment of the fees required 
by the ordinances. 
In June, 1940, the city council of Long Beach passed ordi-
nance C-1815 and ordinance C-1814, which by its terms pur-
H:.. 
ii" 
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ported to amend ordinanceC-1549. At the same time the 
board of harbor commissioners pas.'sed ordinance H. D. 55, 
which purported to amend ordinance H. D. 22. These ordi-
nances required the payment of license fees to the city clerk 
of Long Beach by each person operating an oil well at any 
place within the city· of Long Bcach. They eliminated the 
previous requirement for the· payment of fees to the board 
of harbor commissioners by persons operating oil wells with-
in the harbor district of Long Beach and substituted for that 
requirement the duty to pay to the city clerk the uniform 
fees prescribed for the operation of wells throughout the city. 
In January, 1941, after the enactment of the new ordi-
nances, the Continental Corporation, on its own behalf and as 
agent for the Los Angeles . County Flood Control District, 
applied to the city clerk of Long Beach and to the board of 
harbor commissioners for a permit to operate an oil well on 
the property owned by the Flood Control DiStrict. Neither 
application was accompanied by the fees prescribed in the 
new ordinances, and, on the advice of the city attorney of 
Long Beach, the board of harbor commissioners and the city 
clerk refused to issue the permits. The Continental Corpora- ~ 
tion, acting through its vice president, thereupon filed in the 
superior court an affidavit of contempt setting forth the judg-
ment in the injunction proceeding, the passage of the amenda-
tory ordinances, the application for the permit, and the inten-
tional refusa,l of the defendants to issue the permit without 
the payment of fees. The court held that the members of the 
city council, the members of the board of harbor commis-
sioners, the city clerk, the city attorney, and the deputy city 
attorney had violated the injunction and were therefore guilty 
of conte~pt. Defendants have petitioned for a writ of cer-
tiorari to annul the order of the trial court holding them 
guilty of contempt. 
. [1] The Jq.risdiction of a lower court to issue a final judg-
Ulent of contempt may be reviewed on petition for a writ of 
certiorari. (See cases cited in 5 Cal. Jur. 955.) It is settled 
~hat the question whether the acts complained of can con. 
stitute a contempt is a jurisdictional one for the purposes of 
SU!lh review. (Mattos v. #uperior Court, 30 Cal. App. (2d) 
641 . [86. P. (2d) 1056J; Jonesv. Superior Court, 88 Cal. 
App. 253 [262 Pac. 1098J. See Times Mirror 00. v. Superior 
Court,., 15 Cal. (2d) 99 [98 P. (2d) 1029J; and cases cited 








Apr. 1942] BRUNTON v. SUPERIOR COURT 
[20 C. (2d) 202J 
205 
to the facts. The question is whether the trial court could· 
justifiably hold the petitioners guilty of contempt on the basis 
of their acts as alleged in the affidavit of contempt and as 
shown by the evidence. If these acts were not sufficient to 
constitute a contempt, the judgment cannot stand. 
[2] To hold a person guilty of contempt for violating an 
injunction, the acts constituting the contempt must be clearly 
and specifically prohibited by the terms of the injunction. 
(Mattos v. Superior Court, supra, at 649 and cases there cited; 
American Foundry &7 Mfg. Co. v. Josam Mfg. Co., 79 F. 
(2d) 116, 118; City of Campbell v. Arkans(],s-Miss01tri Power 
Co., 65 F. (2d) 425, 427-428.) The party bound by an in-
junction must be able to determinc from its terms what he may' 
and may not do; he cannot be held guilty of contempt for vio-
lating an injunction that is uncertain or ambiguous (Ibid.), 
just as he Inay not be held guilty of violating a criminal stat-
ute that fails to give him adequate notice of the prohibited 
acts. (See caSes cited in 7 Cal. Jur. 843.) 
[3a] In the present ease, therefore, the petitlOners are guilty 
of contempt only if the acts complained of were clearly pro-
hibited by the terms of the injunction. These acts consisted of 
a refusal to issue to plaintiffs a permit for the operation of an 
oil well without payment of the fees prescribed by the new 
ordinances. Respondents contend that petitioners were en-
joined from attempting to collect any fees from respondents 
for the operation of oil wells. The injunction by its terms, 
however, enjoins petitioners only from attempting to collect 
from respondents those fees required by the old ordinances, 
H. D. 22 as amended by H. D. 38 and C-1549 as amended by 
C-1739. The findings of fact and conclusions of law do not 
indicate that the injunction was any broader in scope. The 
pertinent conclusion of law simply states that plaintiffs "are 
entitled to have issued any permits required by ordinances 
number C-1549, as amended by C-1739, H. D. number 22. as 
amended by H. D. number 38 ... without the payment of 
any of the fees prescribed by said ordinances." The findings 
of fact state: "That ordinance H. D. number 22, as amended' 
by ordinance H. D. number 38, and ordinance number C-1.549, . 
as amended by ordinance number C-1739, require applicants 
as defined in said ordinances to pay the fees therein provided 
for the issuance of the permits described in said ordinances;. 
that the amounts paid for said fees are imposed by said city 
under said ordinances for revenue as well as for regulation; 
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that if any permit is applied for by the plaintiff Los Angeles 
County Flood Control District under any of said ordinances 
for any operations to be carried on under the provisions of 
the· drilling and operating agreement which is attached to 
plaintiffs' Amendedand Supplemental Complaint and marked 
Exhibit A, said District makes such application through its 
officers acting in their official capacity, and the fees prescribed 
by said ordinances are payable for the performance of official 
services of the officers named in said ordinances." 
Respondents contend that these findings constitute a holding 
by the court that all fees of this type are prohibited by section 
4295. of the Political Code, which provides: "State, county 
ana'town:ship officers shall not perform any official services 
unless upon the payment of such fees as are prescribed by law 
for the performance of such services, except ... in the follow-
ing cases: ... (2) ... neither the state nor any county, city 
and county,city, district, or other political subdivision, nor 
any public officer, or board or body, acting in his or its official 
capacity on behalf of the 'state, or any county, city and county, 
city, district or other political subdivision, shall be required 
to payor deposit any fee for the filing of any document or ~ 
paper,. or for the performance of any official service." This 
section is concerned with fees paid to state, county, and town-
ship officers and does not expressly apply to fees paid to 
office:rs of cities. There is no clear and specific statement to 
indicate to petitioners that the court based its decision upon 
this section or that the injunction was intended to prohibit 
the charging of any such fees under any ordinance rather 
than just those provided for by the old ordinances. 
[4] Respondents contend that the statement in the fore-
going findings that the fees were imposed by the city "for 
revenue as well as regulation" indicates the court was of the 
opinion that under article XIII, section 1 of the California 
Constitution no fees for revenue purposes can be imposed by 
one political subdivision upon another. This section provides 
that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value and 
"that property ... such as may belong to the United States, 
this state, or to any county, city and county, or municipal 
corporation WAthin this state shall be exempt from taxa-
tion .. ." If the fee required by the ordinances under con-
sideration is a tax, however, it is not a tax upon the value oi 
the property owned by the Flood Control District but a tax 
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upon the privilege of drilling for oil. It is settled that a 
privilege tax is not a property tax within the meaning of this 
and other sections of the Constitution. (Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. 
(2d) 154 [53 P. (2d) 939, 103 A. L. R. 1] ; Aircraft Co. Inc. 
v. Johnson, 13 Cal. (2d) 545 [90 P. (2d) 572] ; Kaiser Land 
&7 Fruit Co. v. Curry, 155 Cal. 638, 650-654 [103 Pac. 841] ; 
Los Angeles v. Los A.ngeles etc. 00., 152 Cal. 765, 767 [93 Pac. 
1006] ; McAdams Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 
359 [89 P. (2d) 729]; Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson, 13 Cal. 
App. (2d) 720 [57 P.(2d) 1022]; See cases cited in note, 
103 A. L. R. 35 et seq.) If the lower court was of the opinion 
that this constitutional provision prohibited all fees in the 
nature of the ones in question, it failed to give any indication 
sufficient to charge petitioners with notice that the injunction 
extended to all such fees. rather than just those required by 
the old ordinances. 
[3b] It is thus clear that the injunction enjoined petition-
ers from collecting from plaintiffs only those fees required 
by the old ordinances. Petitioners, however, could not evade 
the injunction by the subterfuge of enacting new ordinances 
that did not materially differ from the old ones. (Perry v. 
Kinnear, 42 Ill. 160, 162-3; Ray v. Parish of Rapides, 170 La. 
644 [128 So. 663] ; see cases cited in 32 C. J. 493-4, § 860.) 
Their attempt to collect fees under the new ordinances. would 
constitute contempt of court if the new ordinances were not 
substantially different from the old. A comparison of the oid 
ordinances with the new, however, reveals the following ma-
terial differences: (1) The new ordinances require license 
fees for oil operations anywhere in the city of Long Beach 
whereas the old ordinances were effective only in the harbor 
district of the city. Thus, the old ordinances were discrimina-
tory while the new ones are uniform in operation. (2) Under 
the new ordinances the fees are payable to the city clerk and 
become part of the general funds of the city, whereas under 
the old ordinances the fees were paid to the board of harbor 
commissioners and become part of the harbor revenue fund. 
Since the general funds ·of the city enable it to furnish serv-
ices such as police and fire protection, street maintenance, 
building inspection, and health and sanitary facilities, the 
fees paid under the new ordinances are used to furnish special 
services for the benefit of thbse to whom the permits are issued, 
whereas under the old ordinances the fees collected could be 
expended only by the board of harbor commissionersexclu_ 
sively for harbor purposes. 
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In view of the material differences between the new or-
dinances and the old, petitioners cannot be held guilty of 
violating an injunction that prohibited them from attempt-
ing to collect the fees required by the old ordinances. The 
validity of the new ordinances is not now before this court. 
Piaintiffs are free to. test their validity by appropriate pro-
ceedings. 
The .order is annulled and petiti.oners are discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Car-
ter, J., ~.onc:urred. 
[L. A. No. 17715. In Bank. Apr. 22, 1942.] 
I. A. STUB et al., Resp.ondents, v. FRANK BELMONT, 
Appellant. 
[1] Mortgages - Debt or Obligation Secured - Obligation Other ;.,.., 
than Debt.-At least as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, 
a mortgage on either chattels or real property, given as se-
curity for the performance .of a contract, is valid and proper, 
and may stll-nd' as security for such performance. (See Civ. 
Co.de, § 2920.), (Hayashi v. Pacific Fruit Exchange, 43 Cal. 
~pp: .677, 186Pac. 174, disapproved.) 
[2]. Ohattel Mortgages -:-. Extinguishment - Discharge of Obliga-
.;tion....;,..Oonsig~entOpntract.-Where a note, chattel mortgage 
. and 60nsjgnmept con~ract are given as part of a single trans-
. action, where the mortgage, although making the contract a 
part thereof, expressly provides that it is given as security for 
'a loan and advances and also, for performance of the contract, 
where the contract is supported in part by an adequate inde-
.(, pendent consideration, and where it appears that the mort-
gageeconsignee would benefit therefrom for aflxed period in 
. add~tion to, receiving the amount of his loan and advance-
ments, ,the consjgnment' is not merely an additional method 
of preserving ,the security, but is secured by the mortgage, 
and the mere discharge of the loan and advances does not 
entitle' the mortgagor to a satisfaction of the mortg!lge. 
McK.Dig. References: [1] Mortgage!!, § 72; [2] Chattel Mort-
gages,' § 64; [3], Compromise and Settlement, § 11; [4] Compromise 
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[311., 3b] Oompromise and Settlement-Pleading.-A pleading suf-
ficiently alleges a compromise and settlement of a controversy 
where it alleges (1) that under a consignment contrnct the 
pleader would have made a certain profit during the term 
thereof, (2) a dispute as to the right to have the contract 
continue and be secured by a mortgage during the term, (3) 
a consideration, and (4) an offer and acceptance, and where 
it appears that the dispute was in good faith and that the 
claim was not illegal. 
[4] ld.-Claims Oompromisable.-The consideration necessary to 
support a compromise need not always consist of the surrender 
of a claim that is necessarily legally valid and enforceable. 
[5] Accord and Satisfaction-Oharacter of Dispute.-There is an 
accord and satisfaction where there is a bona fide dispute as 
to a claim, where money is paid and a release given, and this, 
irrespective of the legal enforceability of the claim. 
APPEAL from a judgment .of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Peirson M. Hall, Judge. Reversed. 
Acti.on to recover money paid for cancellati.on of a contract 
and to recover a statutory penalty f.or failure to give a satisfac-
tion of a mortgage on payment thereof. Judgment for the 
plaintiffs on the pleadings" reversed. 
Henry O. Wackerbarth for Appellant. 
Monta W. Shirley and Tayl.orH. Snow f.or Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant appeals' fr.om a judgment for 
$2,000 and a penalty of $100 entered against him pursuant 
to plaintiffs' motion f.or judgment on the pleadings. The 
penalty of $100 wasaw,arded pursuant t.o secti.on 2941 .of the 
Civil Code providing therefor in cases where a m.ortgagee 
fails to give to the mortgagor a satisfaction of mortgage upon 
the payment thereof. 
The f.ollowing facts appear fr.om the affirmative allegations 
in defendant's answer, which must be taken as true in enter-
taining a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Ouneo v. 
Lawson, 203 Cal. IflO [263 Pac. 530)), and the undenied alle-
gations of plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiff Underwood obtained 
titlfl to an orange grove, having purchased it from a Mr. 
[4] See 5 011.1. Jur. 391; 11 Am. Ju,r. 25L 
J 
